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The New GATT Code
and the International
Harmonization of
Products Standards
JON GROETZINGER, JR.*
Enactment by the Ninety-third Congress of the Trade Act of 19741
gave the President of the United States renewed authority to negotiate
reciprocal trade agreements over the next five years, thereby enabling
the United States to join the new round of multinational trade negotia-
tions which opened in Geneva on February 11, 1975, under the
auspices of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A
principal objective of the United States and the many other participant
nations is the elimination of the non-tariff barriers (NTB's) to free
* Member of the New Hampshire bar. B.A. 1971, Middlebury College; J.D. 1974,
Cornell University.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-618 (Dec. 20, 1974), 88 Stat. 1978. Among the major purposes of the
Act, according to its introduction, are the promotion of "open and nondiscriminatory
world trade" and attempts to "harmonize, reduce and eliminate barriers to trade on a
basis which assures substantially equivalent competitive opportunity for the commerce of
the United States ... " Id., §§ 2(1), (2). The legislative history fully supports this intent.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee, for example, identified the purpose of the
bill as the promotion of "an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world economic system,"
and noted that it would
authorize the President, for a period of five years, to enter into trade agree-
ments with foreign countries for the purpose of establishing fairness and equity
in international trading relations, including.., the harmonization, reduction,
and elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to . . . international trade
[and to] authorize the President to negotiate trade agreements with foreign
countries providing for the harmonization, reduction, and elimination of non-
tariff barriers ... and to establish constitutionally appropriate procedures for
the consideration and implementation of such agreements by the Congress...
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
8246-47. The applicable sections of the Act authorize the President to conduct negotia-
tions with foreign countries but require consultation with Congress before an agreement
is reached. Id., §§ 101-10. Section 121 of the Act deals specifically with the GATT talks.
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trade represented by, among other things, incompatible products stan-
dards.
Products standards represent the specifications involving the quality,
safety, performance or other characteristics with which producers
either may or must comply in the development and production of a
good or a manufacturing process. If a producer fails to comply with a
given standard, he may find it difficult or may be prohibited entirely
from marketing his inventory in a locality in which the standard is in
force. A nation which seeks to curb imports in selected industries may
do so by developing a standard with which compliance is mandatory
and with which overseas competitors find it uneconomical to comply.
The development of such a standard may often serve a legitimate
purpose, such as protecting public health and safety. It is often no
simple task, however, to determine whether the intent behind the
development of a particular standard was for one of these purposes, or
whether it was created primarily to protect a domestic industry from
foreign competition. 2 In either case, the existence of incompatible
products standards presents a major obstacle to international trade.
This article will examine the problem of incompatible standards and
review the various international and regional efforts to reconcile the
differences between standards, a process called "harmonization of
standards."
I
THE MOVE TOWARD HARMONIZATION
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Until recently little attention was paid to the problems of both
incompatible products standards and other types of NTB's.3 Within the
2. R. BALDWIN, NoN-TARIFF DIsTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 143-48 (1970).
For example, is there merit in the complaints of those who export motor vehicles and
equipment to the United States that some of the safety standards of the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 etseq. (1970) may be more appropriate for the type
of automobiles generally produced by the large American manufacturers than by foreign
car producers? Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 311 (1968).
Query, however, what safety interest of the Norwegian public is protected by the
regulation that the "sole of all shoes must be made of a single piece of natural leather,
which precludes [the use] of artificial leathers such as 'corfam.' "Non-Tariff Barriers: An
Inventory, INT'L COMM., Sept. 21, 1970, at 13.
For an extensive worldwide inventory of standards which may potentially function as
non-tariff barriers, see Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals, supra, at 123-312; INT'L
COM., supra, at 9-14.
3. The Kennedy Round of the GATT considered only a few non-tariff barriers such
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past several years, however, the problem of harmonizing incompatible
standards has become important to such bodies as the GATT, the
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), and the United Nations Economic Committee for
Europe (ECE). The following are the principal factors influencing this
change:
1. The first six rounds of the GATT have produced an average
reduction in tariff barriers of ten percent. Since the initial reduction of
higher tariff levels seems to be a more effective stimulant to trade than
their final elimination, 4 other trade barriers, including the existence of
products standards, have now acquired growing significance. National
groups, formerly protected from foreign competition by high tariffs,
now feel obliged to pressure their respective legislatures into adopting
new non-tariff protective devices.
2. Recent years have seen vast increases in international trade as well
as the development of higher levels of technology, both of which have
required greatly accelerated standards-making activities.5 Nations
throughout the world have realized that such a flurry of activity has
increased the likelihood that incompatible standards will be developed,6
and, as a consequence, are beginning to see the benefit both in
harmonizing existing standards before the divergence becomes too
great, and in creating new standards which will be uniform from the
date of their creation.
3. The rise of great multinational corporations has proven to be an
incentive to unify standards, especially engineering ones, since compo-
nents manufactured in several countries must be compatible with all
other parts of the assembled product.
7
as the American Selling Pricing System of Customs valuation of certain benzenoid
chemicals [See Middleton, Technical Specifications: A Case Study of Non-tariff Barriers to Trade
(1), 12 E.F.T.A. BULL. No. 2, at 3-5 (1971)], an agreement on an antidumping code, and
elimination of certain non-tariff restrictions, such as the discriminatory European road-
use taxes on U.S. automobiles. The field of standards was not then discussed. Travaglini,
Expanding World Trade: Facts and Problems, 45 DENy. L. REv. 736, 737 (1968).
4. H. STEVENS & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1063 (1968).
5. For example, 80-90 percent of the international standards in force today were
adopted within the last ten years. It is anticipated that their number will increase tenfold
in the next ten years. Hearings on H.R. 8111 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Interstate andForeign Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 49 at 1 (1971).
6. The divergence, especially in national safety standards, appears to be accelerating
rather than diminishing. "In 1955, for example, one basic Volkswagen model could be
exported anywhere in Europe whereas now nine to ten variations of the basic model are
needed to satisfy the different safety standards." BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 145.
7. A Metric America: Time for Decision, COMMERCE TODAY, August 9, 1971, at 8.
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4. In recent years, in response to consumer pressure, governments
in Western and non-Communist nations have become increasingly
demanding in the areas of product safety and public health, and have
published health and safety standards with which consumer products
must conform.
5. The number of voluntary standards, i.e., where compliance is not
legally required, 8 has increased as manufacturers have attempted to
meet consumer demands for comparative shopping" 'measuring-sticks'
which clearly tell consumer buyers what levels of performance can be
expected from each product."9
The problem of transnational deviations among products standards
can only be solved through international negotiation and consensus.
The process of harmonizing national product standards, however, is
not an easy one; it involves not only conciliation at the standard-
development stage, but also continuous cooperation at later stages as
well. It is only through an analysis of the process that an accurate
appraisal of its likely success can be made.
B. THE TOTAL HARMONIZATION SOLUTION
The process of total international harmonization of products stan-
dards involves three steps. First, differing products standards must be
made uniform. As many nations as possible should participate in the
effort so that the stragglers will not find that other nations have
adopted a uniform standard different from their own.' 0
8. A distinction has been drawn between voluntary and mandatory standards. Volun-
tary standards are those which are accepted and used by certain persons, but compliance
therewith is not required by law. Although not binding by themselves, they may have
considerable effect in a market if a large number of users give preference to products
conforming to such standards. For example, an American building contractor might not
wish to use imported materials which fail to meet United States standards, even though
he would legally be permitted to do so.
Mandatory standards are those with which the law demands compliance. Their
objective is not so much standardization as it is to ensure minimum levels of safety,
performance, or accuracy in products. Middleton, supra note 3, at 3. Mandatory stan-
dards are usually the more obvious barriers to trade because imported products must
often conform to them or be barred from sale. Often they are developed initially as
voluntary standards, but are then adopted by legislation or regulation as mandatory
standards. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has by
regulation referenced more than 120 voluntary standards. These were originally volun-
tary standards promulgated by the American National Standards Institute. See American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), The Role of the American National Standards
Institute 1, 1972. (This and other ANSI pamphlets may be obtained from the American
National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, New York, 10018.)
9. Hearings on H.R. 8111, supra note 5, at 78.
10. American oxygen hose used in operating cutting tools is colored green in accor-
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Secondly, the programs of tests and inspections which ensure that a
product has complied with a uniform standard ("quality assurance"
systems) must be harmonized through the adoption of common stan-
dards for testing laboratories, with designated national agencies ac-
crediting the labs and maintaining a constant check on compliance with
such standards. Failure to do this would lead to increased production
and selling costs.'1 Finally, there must be a joint development of
programs which in some way mark a product in order to show that it
complies with a given standard ("certification" systems). Often orders
are placed for only those products with a specific certifying mark.
Producers in countries which have not adopted the system must go to
the expense of securing this mark, while risking possible refusal by a
target nation to place the mark on the product.12
dance with a United States national standard. Chiefly due to lack of American participa-
tion in discussions abroad, European standards provide for the color blue. Hence, United
States hose cannot be exported to Europe. Lack of U.S. Action in World Standards Costs
Exporters $, COMMERCE TODAY, May 31, 1971, at 7. One large United States concern has
indicated that the price of its home laundry machine has risen fifteen percent due to the
extra expenses incurred in adapting the machine to different European standards.
Jenssen, Common Industrial Standards, 8 E.F.T.A. BULL., May, 1967, at 8-9. See Hearings on
S. 1257 and S. 1798 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate
Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1257
and S. 1798].
11. Since Italy does not recognize inspection of certain types of equipment by the
inspection associations in exporting nations or, presumably, by the foreign manufacturer
himself, it provides its own inspectors. French and German exporters have repeatedly
complained that Italy causes long delays in shipments because it fails to supply inspectors
"for months on end." And even when inspectors do arrive, their expenses and the costs
of the tests they perform, if any, are usually paid for by the exporter, thereby increasing
the production and selling costs of the product and reducing any competitive advantage
in the target country it might otherwise have had. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 144.
12. The Tripartite Accord on Electrical Components, originally signed by the United
Kingdom, France, and West Germany and drafted under the auspices of the European
Standards Coordinating Committee (CENEL), an organization of the members of the
national standards bodies of the Common Market and European Free Trade Association,
provides for a system for certifying complying products with a "mark of conformity."
Lack of U.S. Action in World Standards Costs Exporters $, supra note 10, at 6. The Accord
specifies that once an "Authorized Institution" places the "mark of conformity" on a
good, other signatories must accept the product without further testing.
Products imported from non-member countries such as the United States not bearing
the "mark of conformity" have to undergo local testing and certification even though the
United States commodity may be identical to those of member nations in every other
respect. Lack of U.S. Action in World Standards Costs Exporters $, supra note 10, at 6. This
means additional costs and delays. If United States electronic goods were excluded under
the system, the sales loss would be $2.2 billion, or about seventy percent of the total
worldwide American electronic exports of $3.2 billion. Hearings on S. 1257 and S. 1798 at
128. The probable takeover of the system by the International Electrotechnical Commit-
tee (IEC) in the near future would permit expanded worldwide membership with
American participation. Id., at 32.
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It is clear that adoption of a harmonization system through this
three-step procedure would benefit manufacturers and consumers
alike. In addition to the primary benefit of freeing economic relations
from the distortions caused by differences in standards and standards
systems, it would foster innovation by permitting sellers to market new
products with confidence that they meet accepted standards which
purchasers require. It would increase the interchangeability and accept-
ability of products and would lower production and selling costs.13
Standardized products would often be more dependable because they,
would have been tested to conform with standards which were known
to be reliable. Further, harmonization would reduce the amount of
requisite quality control through enlarged production scales, conserve
time and money in purchasing, limit the amount of paperwork, facili-
tate the training of personnel, expedite the introduction of automation,
and create more sources of supply for parts.1 4
A totally harmonized world, however, may be the technician's impos-
sible dream. Its adoption may be possible only for certain goods under
specified conditions. A single set of standards cannot always account
for differing national values and circumstances. Differences in climate,
for example, may make a uniform standard regulating the manufac-
ture of sardine cans appropriate for production at sea level, but
inappropriate at higher elevation where altitude may affect the cans'
seams.' 5 The advantages of a single set of standards, moreover, will
often be outweighed in situations where concerns for public health
and safety emphasize a need for a "best possible" standard rather than
a uniform standard. Many nations may not compromise a high national
safety standard just to adopt a lesser uniform international standard.
Conversely, countries with a lower standard may not feel necessarily
compelled to adopt a higher international standard where they believe
their populaces are already sufficiently well-protected.
Recognizing the impracticality of total harmonization and the need
for a broadly workable solution, numerous bilateral and multilateral
compromise measures have been proposed by various organizations
13. Standardization of light bulb base sizes, thread and bulb configurations in the
United States in the first part of this century greatly simplified manufacturing proce-
dures, consumers' shopping, and decreased the cost of bulbs. Going Metric Alone Won't
Solve Nation's World Trade Problems, COMMERCE TODAY, Jan. 8, 1973, at 10-13.
14. American National Standards Institute, The Role of the American National
Standards Institute, supra note 8, at 2.
15. Paper by R.F.J. Teichmann, Ninth Triennial Meeting of the ISO, Sept. 13, 1973,
at 5.
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concerned with international products standards. It is these suggestions
which will likely serve as the model for the new GATT Code on
Standards.
II
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS
A lack of centralization in the standards-making process had resulted
in almost as many standards organizations as published standards. A
partial listing of international organizations which are involved in the
standards area numbers over two dozen. 16 Some are treaty organiza-
tions, some are non-treaty, and many are agencies of the United
Nations. In addition, there are hundreds of national standards groups
which may directly or indirectly have an effect on international
standards-making. This proliferation of organizations represents per-
haps the principal cause for the burgeoning number of incompatible
standards appearing on the world's markets.
A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION
(ISO) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION (IEC)
1. History and Procedures of the ISO and IEC
The ISO and the IEC are closely allied and perform similar functions.
The IEC, the older of the two, has been collaborating on standards in
the electrotechnical field since 1906.17 The ISO, which began to func-
tion on an official basis in 1947, was an outgrowth of the United
Nations Standards Coordinating Committee, a wartime group of the
national standards bodies of eighteen allied countries.18 Its work covers
every area of technology except electrotechnical questions which
16. International organizations involved in the standards areas include the Asian
Standards Advisory Committee, the European Committee for Standardization, the
Commonwealth Standards Conference, the Pan American Standards Commission, and
the International Organization for Standardization. Certain international organizations,
such as the European Economic Community and the United Nations, have divisions
devoted to international standardization. Prominent among these is the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission of the United Nations (see notes 38-39 infra). American National
Standards Institute, The ABC's of International Standardization, 1972.
17. Jenssen, supra note 9, at 8-9.
18. 0. Sturen, Toward Global Acceptance of International Standards 1, 1972 (ANSI
pamphlet).
[Vol. 8: 168
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remain in the jurisdiction of the lEG. The objective of both organiza-
tions is to encourage agreement among producers, buyers, govern-
ments and scientific groups on harmonized "International Standards."
While their goal was initially to reconcile differences between national
standards, a new role, the development of an international agreement
on a single standard, has been emerging. This role is especially
apparent in areas of new technology where standards have yet to be
created. 19 In addition both have begun to harmonize certification
systems.
The procedure for formulating a standard in the IS020 begins when
a draft proposal of a standard is submitted by one of the organization's
technical committees to the central secretariat 2 ' for registration as a
draft ISO standard. A draft which is adopted by a majority of the
participants on the technical committee and approved by 60 percent of
the member national standards bodies is forwarded to the ISO Council
for acceptance and publication.
22
The member bodies of ISO are the "most representative organiza-
tions for standardization" in their respective countries.23 In 1973 there
were 56 member bodies24 of which the developing nations formed a
majority. Seventy percent of them were either governmental institu-
tions or organizations incorporated by public law.
The character of each member body varies from country to country.
Domestic industry participates in the work of the ISO through the
national member body; some member bodies are heavily influenced by
suggestions of indistry while others are not. In some instances the
member institution has domestic duties such as certification and quality
control in addition to international responsibilities; others participate
only at the ISO level. 5 In most countries there exists a type of
partnership between the government and the national standards or-
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. The ISO is the larger of the two organizations and carries out its programs
through 1,400 technical committees, subcommittees, and working groups comprised of
50,000 experts from all over the world. Its Geneva central secretariat, which acts as the
post office for the technical committees and adds the final touch to their recommenda-
tions, has a staff of 85 from twenty nations. See generally, Reduced Trade Barriers Aim as
Negotiators Meet to Plan Worldwide Talk, COMMERCE TODAY, Oct. 15, 1973, at 7-10.
21. See note 20 supra.
22. Hearings on S. 1257 and S. 1798 at 47.
23. Id. at 130.
24: American National Standards Institute, ISO Member Bodies, 1973.
25. Id.
1975]
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ganization.2 6 The United States, however, constitutes an exception to
this latter rule: American participation in the ISO is through the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which has neither offi-
cial recognition nor financial support from its government.2 7 A private
national conglomerate of U.S. citizens and institutions involved in the
standards area, ANSI coordinates the development of standards in the
private sector and compiles and publishes them. It does not, in and of
itself, develop standards.
Adoption by member nations of published ISO standards is volun-
tary. Of the over 2,500 ISO standards presently published 28 some
nations such as the U.S.S.R. have published hundreds while others
have adopted fewer than twenty.29 Among Western European coun-
tries (in the European Committee for Standardization) there has been a
trend toward the adoption of international rather than national stan-
26. The degree of the governmental subsidization of the organization, however, varies
from country to country. There is one hundred percent funding in Russia. Hearings on S.
1257 and S. 1798 at 74. In England the government provides matching funds, sometimes
over fifty percent, to the British Standards Institute. Hearings on H.R. 8111, supra note 5,
at 40. In France the non-governmental AFNOR (Association, Francaise de Normalisa-
tion), the French member of the ISO, receives approximately two-thirds of its budget
from a special tax France charges domestic industry. It is a parafiscal tax applied as an
additional part of the "value-added" tax. Hearings on S. 1257 and S. 1798 at 46.
27. Hearings on H.R. 8111, supra note 5, at 58. ANSI is also closely allied with the U.S.
National Committee of IEC, sponsored by twenty-nine different domestic organizations,
Hearings on S. 1257 and S. 1798 at 147.
ANSI's activities both domestically and on the ISO are supported solely through
membership dues, the sale of published standards, and certification accreditation fees.
American National Standards Institute, The Role of the American National Standards
Institute, supra note 8, at 1. The United States government's role in international
standards activity has been limited to providing ANSI with technical information and the
services of technical experts, despite several attempts to provide further and quite
extensive government support. See S. 1798, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 8111, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 7506, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). These bills would have
allowed for the issuance of grants to qualified private, non-profit. organizations such as
ANSI for the promotion and development of international standards and fostering
United States participation on international standards-making bodies by clarifying the
authority of the Department of Commerce to promote such activities. See also Hearings on
.H.R. 8111, supra note 5, at 15.
ANSI's solely private funding has resulted in a discontinuity of representation and an
erratic performance by the United States in the ISO. Participation has been excellent in
areas in which there is a strong industrial interest, such as in the fields of petroleum
products, data processing and automobiles, but where interest is weak, participation has
been minimal. Id at 58.
It was United States representation at the ISO which prevented the international
adoption of the Swiss national standard for automobile headlights which would have
excluded sealed beams of the American variety. See Travaglini, supra note 3.
2-.gS-e2e d-iiM~i-T4Tfone WoWt Solve Ntaion's-W-rld-ade Froblns, supra nbte 13, at 12,
and Sturen, supra note 18, at 2-3.
29. American National Standards Institute, ISO Member Bodies, supra note 24.
[Vol. 8: 168
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dards. This has been made a matter of official policy in the German
Standards Association (DNA).30 In France 95 percent of the ISO
standards published have been adopted, 65 percent without modifica-
tion. 31 A parallel development exists in Eastern Europe through the
organization COMECON. 3' The Pan American Standards Commission
(COPANT), which is developing uniform standards for Latin America,
has also agreed to use ISO/IEC standards whenever possible.
33
The process of adopting uniform ISO standards nationally may be
effected by either (1) re-printing the ISO standards in full in the
national implementing legislation, or (2) incorporating the standards by
mere reference in such legislation. The latter approach, known as the
"reference to standards" method, has received considerable attention in
the ISO/IEC and merits special discussion.
2. The "Reference to Standards" Method of Adoption
Initially suggested by France and subsequently advocated in a Draft
ISO/LEC Code of Principles on "Reference to Standards," the reference
to standards method proposes that
[national] regulatory bodies should not produce their own technical specifica-
tions or develop their own test methods, but rather rely on the [international]
standards organizations for this work and then in the regulations refer to the
standards prepared and promulgated by these organizations.
34
Reference is usually to either a numbered international standard or to
a particular section of a numbered standard, including its number, date
of issue and any amendments.
Advantages of this method as compared to the process of printing
the standards in full in the implementing legislation are apparent.
Legislative work, importantly, is simplified and accelerated. Mistakes
can no longer creep into drafts of statutes and de-harmonize otherwise
uniform standards. The work of international standards organizations,
moreover, can be more readily utilized, technical regulations can more
30. D. Peyton, The Economic Impact of International Metric Standards (ANSI pam-
phlet 1973).
31. Paper by H. Durand, Ninth Triennial Meeting of the ISO, Sept. 13, 1973, at 5.
32. Sturen, supra note 18, at 5-8.
33. W. McAdams, International Standards-The Impact on U.S. Business 4-5 (ANSI
pamphlet 1972).
It should be noted, however, that in many countries adoption of ISO standards is
merely a gesture of goodwill since national standards, especially in the highly developed
countries, are already compatible with those of the ISO. Hearings on S. 1257 and S. 1798,
supra note 10, at 132.
34. Sturen, supra note 18, at 9.
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rapidly respond to technological advance, and supervision of technical
requirements remains the duty of expert technical staffs. All technical
regulations, finally, can be arranged within one unified, systematic
Code.
In the United States, however, there are disadvantages which become
apparent with the use of this technique. Certain state constitutional
limitations on the use of referential legislation exist.3 5 Standards-
making responsibilities, furthermore, may be improperly delegated to
private bodies where a legislative or governmental agency prospectively
adopts by reference standards not yet developed by private interest
groups:
The constitutional nostril of the court begins to sniff. . . when the legislature
adopts not only the existing standards of some technical or professional group,
but any which it may prescribe in the future.3 6
The greatest difficulty in using the "reference to standards"
technique, however, is that it may tend to bypass many of the "due
process" steps constitutionally required in the standards-making and
adopting process. A 1960 case indicates that standards-making agencies
should: (1) give interested parties an opportunity to be heard, (2)
provide due notice of any hearing on proposed standards, (3) ensure
fair conduct during the hearing, (4) include support for the decision in
the record of the hearing, (5) submit proposed findings and a tentative
report, and (6) allow for an opportunity to file and to be heard upon
exceptions to the report.37 This analysis indicates that there might well
be a denial of due process if an ISO standard were adopted merely by
reference to a single ISO volume of standards without appropriate
notice and hearings. Such conduct might also violate the statutes under
which national agencies operate in adopting standards. 38 In practice,
35. See Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898); Bloxton v.
State Highway Comm., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d 392 (1928); KY. CONST. § 51.
36. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201, 229 (1937). See also
Hillman v. Northern Wasco Co. People's Util. Distr., 213 Or. 264, 323 P.2d 664 (1958),
disapproving of the delegation of legislative powers to a private agency. One solution to
the problem may be that instead of prospectively adopting by reference an international
standard, the adopting legislation should provide that conformity to future standards will
constitute "prima fade" evidence of compliance with the regulation as well.
37. Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Benson, 181 F. Supp. 62 (D.C.N.J. 1960), aff'd 288 F.2d 608 (3d
Cir. 1961).
38. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 21102-103 (1972), for the procedures to be used in adopting
Codex Alimentarius standards.
While the "reference to standards" technique may still be used if the required hearings
take place, the more hearings and suggested changes to which a standard is exposed, the
less likely it is to remain uniform among the adopting nations.
[vol. 8: 168
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however, the need to have the complete text of the standards available
during the adoption procedures and hearings has generally meant that
to date the "reference to standard" technique has not been frequently
employed in the few cases in which the United States has adopted
international standards.3 9
B. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)
The concept of standards harmonization has been well-suited to the
EEC's objective of bringing together "an area in which economic
exchanges develop in a domestic market.... [where] all barriers would
disappear . "..."40
The EEC had several options in harmonizing standards. It could, for
example, have drafted an international convention which was self-
executing or which required signatories to enact standards identical to
a model contained in the convention. Instead, however, it decided to
gradually harmonize existing legislation. Its legal basis for such a
course rested in several articles of the Treaty of Rome, 41 including
articles 100 and 101 (relating to approximation of legislation), in
articles 30 et seq. (concerning measures which are equivalent to
eliminating quantitative restrictions), and in the "catch-all" article 235
(dealing with supplementary action to achieve one of the objectives of
the Community not provided for elsewhere in the Treaty).42
While prior to 1968 a number of proposals for uniform standards
had been submitted to the EEC Council of Ministers, 43 the Council had
In a related context nonobservance of certain steps in the standards-making process,
such as the failure to allow a wide variety of interests to participate in the development
and adoption of standards, may constitute a violation of anti-trust laws. For an excellent
article discussing the problem see Baker, Antitrust as a Spur to Technical Progress, 23 AM.
U.L. REv. 547 (1974).
39. For example, the Food and Drug Administration in proposals for adopting the
food products standards of the International Codex Alimentarius Commission as United
States standards has published the full standards in the Federal Register. 38 Fed. Reg.
10952-56, 12234-38, 12396-97 (1973).
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an international agency jointly sponsored by
the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health Organiza-
tion, whose task it is to develop and administer a program of drafting recommended
international food standards which, when adopted by member nations, will be applied by
those countries to domestic products, imports and exports.
40. Waelbroeck, Recent Developments and Future Prospects of the Common Market, 1 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 2 (1970).
41. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3. An unofficial English text may be found in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. (1972).
42. Middleton, supra note 3, at 6. Cf., replies of the Commission to questions in the
European Parliament. 8 E.E.C. J.O. 1161, 2250 (1965).
43. E.g., see 8 E.E.C. J.O. 1729 (1965).
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adopted only a few as directives. During March 1968, however, the
EEC Commission submitted to the Council for approval a "general
program for the elimination of technical barriers to trade caused by
disparities between legislative measures in Member States. '44 On May
28, 1969, the Council adopted the program in two resolutions.45 These
resolutions, one commentator said,
established a timetable for the elimination of [technical] obstacles [in the indus-
trial and food products area] and, as an interim measure, provided that Member
States refrain from adopting any new regulations likely to create a technical
obstacle to trade without first consulting with the Commission and the other
Member States in order to arrive at common measures. The purpose of this
provision is to prevent creation of a new obstacle to trade while work is being
done to approximate legislation in a given area.
46
Recognizing the great difficulty of harmonizing the entire industrial
and agricultural products sector, however, the EEC has recently shifted
its ground:
Brussels now will push for legislative harmonization only when this is absolutely
necessary to assure the free flow of goods and services and only when all other
means fail .... According to Brussels' revised concept, total harmonization will
be replaced by partial harmonization or other methods to improve interstate
trade.4
7
In areas of health and environmental and consumer protection, how-
ever, the EEC will continue to push towards total harmonization.48
The approximation of standards mentioned in the 1969 resolutions
is typically accomplished through a directive. The directive is adopted
when the EEC Commission, having regulative competence, proposes
that the Council of Ministers, composed of representatives from the
Member States, address a directive to the Member States. The Euro-
pean Parliament and others are consulted and a directive is issued. For
example, in the adoption of a directive "on the approximation of the
laws of these Member States relating to emulsifiers, stabilizers, thicken-
ers and gelling agents for use in foodstuffs," the Council received a
proposal from the Commission. 49 The European Parliament then of-
fered its opinion on the proposal, 50 as did the Economic and Social
44. Middleton, supra note 3, at 6.
45. 12 E.E.C. J.O., COMMUNICATIONS No. 76, at 1, 5 (1969).
46. Waelbroeck, supra note 42, at 4.
47. Report No. 233, Feb. 27, 1974, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP., at I.
48. Id. at 2.
49. No citation to the Commission's proposal was given in 17 E.E.C. J.O., LEGISLATION
No. 189, at 1-7 (1974).
50. 12 E.E.C. J.O., COMMUNICATIONS No. 139, at 45 (1969).
[Vol. 8: 168
The GATT Code and Products Standards
Committee, 51 whereupon the Council issued a directive which included
general criteria regarding the purity of these products and test proce-
dures for determining purity. 52 The directive does not dictate the form
and means by which it is to be implemented by a Member State; this is
left to the discretion of the domestic agency. Instead it gives guidelines
which must be in some manner incorporated into the national stan-
dards legislation.5 3
The standard in the directive may not necessarily be one developed
by the EEC Council, but may instead be a referenced international
standard promulgated by, for example, the ISO or IEC. While the
Council's reference to an international standard may be voluntary,
referencing of the directive's standard or an "approximation" thereof
by a Member State is mandatory.54
C. EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AsSOCIATION (EFTA)
Unlike the EEC, the EFTA realized from the beginning that achiev-
ing total harmonization would be impractical, and therefore it was
never attempted. The EFTA rejected proposals to harmonize stan-
dards through "approximation" legislation,55 to create agreements by
which importing countries would license manufacturing plants in ex-
porting countries, 56 or to harmonize quality assurance systems.57 The
Council instead desired an approach which could be rapidly im-
51. 12 E.E.C. J.O., COMMUNICATIONS No. 144, at 8 (1969).
52. 17 E.E.C. J.O., LEGISLATION No. 189, at 1-7 (1974); see Articles 6 and 7. For
additional examples of directives, see 17 E.E.C.J.O., LEGISLATION No. 191, at 1-10 (1974)
(rear view mirrors, field of vision, and windshield wipers) and 17 E.E.C. J.O., LEGISLA-
TION No. 221 at 1-14 (1974) (motor vehicle seats and anchorages, and honey).
53. Skubiszewski, Enactment of Law by International Organizations, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
198, 235 (1965-66).
54. During the whole process of "approximating" a standard in a directive, one
question which has remained unexplored is "how approximate" the standard enacted by
a Member State may be; at what point is a standard described in a directive so materially
changed in the national legislation as to be no longer "approximate" or uniform? The
answer to this question is, of course, beyond the scope of this article.
55. The EFTA had been a witness to the difficulties of the EEC in reaching agreement
on uniform standards which were acceptable to various levels of technology.
56. Under this proposal, an importing country would inspect another nation's export
manufacturing plants and license them if it was duly satisfied. It was felt, however, that
such a program would be costly and time-consuming, and might be forbidden in some
countries outlawing inspection of certain plants by foreign inspectors. Convention to
Remove Barriers to Trade in Pharmaceutical Products, 11 E.F.T.A. BULL. No. 8, at 3, 4 (1970).
57. The Association rejected this plan since it believed there would be too long a delay
if national legislation had to be amended to provide for uniform testing and inspection
among adhering countries. Id.
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plemented through existing institutions without impeding future har-
monization efforts. These criteria were more relevant to EFTA
economically than they had been to the EEC due to "the size of EFTA
and the relatively high proportion of trade with countries outside the
free trade zone.' '5 8
The Joint EFTA/Finland Council, therefore, adopted on April 5,
1968, a program which provided for the referencing of relevant
standards of international products standards agencies whenever they
were adopted. The EFTA itself, however, would develop and publish
no standards of its own. Deviation from these standards was permitted
only when it was genuinely justifiable and, even then, only upon notice
to other Member States. If appropriate international standards did not
exist, the guidelines suggested that EFTA members take the initiative
in the appropriate international body to have relevant standards for-
mulated. This program was adopted despite the lack of express legal
authority in its Stockholm Convention to deal in this area; reliance was
instead placed on "EFTA 'pragmatism.' ,,59
The approach provided for the reciprocal recognition of tests
whereby an importing country would recognize tests conducted by a
testing institution in the exporting nation pursuant to the requirements
of the importing country. Membership was to be open to both EFTA
and non-EFTA nations. Such a scheme could be rapidly implemented
without changing national legislation, without harmonizing standards,
and without impeding the progress of future harmonization.
Between 1969 and 1970 expert groups were authorized to draft a
proposed scheme which could be applied to pharmaceuticals, pressure
vessels, agricultural machinery and tractors, gas appliances and ships'
equipment. 60 The EFTA Convention for the Mutual Recognition of
Inspections in respect of the Manufacturing of Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts, signed on October 8, 1970, is illustrative of this interim road to
harmonization. The area of pharmaceuticals has in the past been a
heavily licensed one in which products are often doubly tested, both in
the exporting nation, to assure compliance with domestic standards,
and again in the target nation.
The Convention provides that the national standards institution in
the importing state ask the national institution in the exporting state
58. Middleton, supra note 3, at 8.
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 7.
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for information regarding the general manufacturing standards of the
firm in question, as well as specific standards relating to certain prod-
ucts. After inspection of the plant, the manufacturing nation's institu-
tion sends along the information. If the inspection or information is
insufficient, the target nation can request further information through
specific interrogatories, which the exporting nation can supply on -a
voluntary basis through further inspection. The information contained
in a confidential report is then evaluated by the importing nation
which, if satisfied, grants an import license.
Manufacturers are safeguarded in two ways. First, a manufacturer is
under no duty to transmit the requested information during the
inspection.61 Second, only quality control information need be
supplied; this usually excludes the areas of technical know-how, re-
search and development, and financial matters.62
D. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT)
Since tariffs between international trading nations have in recent
years been substantially reduced, 63 GATT has recently become much
more interested in the non-tariff area of trade barriers. One working
committee of GATT's Council of Representatives recently developed
an inventory of over eight hundred separate non-tariff barriers
(NTB's) which it then divided into five subheadings, one of which was
standards.64
While the role of standards-making is clearly outside the scope of the
GATT, the trade barrier which is imposed by differences between
61. Such action may, however, lead the importing state to conclude that its informa-
tion is insufficient, and thus deny the license.
62. This description of the pharmaceutical scheme is from Convention to Remove
Barriers to Trade in Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 56, at 5.
The scheme for pressure vessels is similar to that of the pharmaceutical convention in
that the importing nation recognizes an act of a certified institution in the exporting
nation. Here the exporting nation's institution conducts tests which may be based either
on standards adopted by the importing nation or, alternatively, in accord with other
standards, e.g., the exporter's standards, which have been declared acceptable by the
importing nation.
63. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
64. The five include government participation in trade (subsidies, government pur-"
chasing, etc.), customs and administrative entry procedures, standards, quantitative
restrictions, and charges on imports (surcharges, prior import deposits, etc.). Reduced
Trade Barriers Aim as Negotiators Meet to Plan Worldwide Talk, supra note 20, at 9.
Most of GATT's work is carried on by the Council of Representatives, which makes
reports at the meetings of the Contracting Parties and supervises working groups and
committees.
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product standards clearly is not. There is, however, no explicit authori-
zation for standards work in the GATT itself. While several articles
of GATT deal with certain non-tariff trade barriers,65 there has been
no mention of the harmonization of standards per se. Such authoriza-
tion may, however, be implied from the fact that a lack of harmoni-
zation hampers the basic goals of the GATT described in the
Preamble-to substantially reduce tarriffs and other barriers to trade and
to eliminate discriminatory treatment.6 6 In addition, Article XX pro-
vides that safety and health measures (which often take the form of
standards) should not be applied so as to constitute unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where similar conditions prevail.6 7
1. The GATT Push for Standards Harmonization
Each of the five NTB subheadings developed by the Council's
working committee is handled by various working groups. The Work-
ing Group on Standards has proceeded faster towards a solution of the
trade barrier problem than many of the others. Based upon a United
States proposal made to the Group in May 1970 and other suggestions,
the Group has already made several drafts of a Code of Conduct
relating to standards.6 8 It can be expected that the Code which is finally
adopted will encourage agreeing nations to adopt existing standards
which have been harmonized by international standards bodies to the
greatest extent possible, except where they are "inappropriate." 69
In order to ensure the signatures of nations such as the United States
having complex standards-adopting procedures, the Code should re-
quire its adherents to follow steps which are consistent with "due
process of law," e.g., providing interested parties with notice that work
is being conducted on a standard, allowing them an opportunity for
comment on the proposal, .publicizing the adopted standard, and
65. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. III-XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
Parts 5-6 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter cited as GATTI], deal
generally with non-tariff barriers. More specifically, Article IX imposes restraints on
national requirements of marks of origin and Article XI, para. I bars import restrictions
such as quotas other than duties.
66. See the Preamble to GATT, supra note 65.
67. GATT art. XI, para. 2(b); Note, The Restrictive Effects of Industrial Standards on
International Commerce, 4 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 607 (1972).
68. Further work on this Code has already begun at negotiations this year.
69. "Inappropriateness" will certainly include the excuse that "the international stan-
dard is not truly global, but is loaded in favor of a particular regional technology, so that
its adoption would be discriminatory." STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 4, at 1049.
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allowing a reasonable interval between the date the standard is adopted
and the date upon which it is to take effect so that producers affected
by the standard have a reasonable time within which to comply.70 Since
countries vary widely in the percentage of voluntary and mandatory
standards adopted,7 1 furthermore, the Code should acknowledge the
distinction and provide accordingly for different adoption procedures
and obligations.
Where harmonization of test methods and quality assurance systems
is concerned, widest adoption of the Code will be possible if it allows
for either (1) a flexible EFTA-type scheme where differing test and
inspection methods acceptable to importing nations are conducted by
national exporting institutions, or perhaps (2) a self-testing and self-
certification program conducted by exporting manufacturers them-
selves.
2. Problems Confronting the Proposed GATT Code on Standards
The Working Group on Standards will have to confront several
difficulties in drafting a Code on Standards. Perhaps the major prob-
lem concerns the question of what form the Code should take. It could
be either an executive agreement or a treaty; if the latter, the choice is
between a self-executing treaty or an executory one. The relationship
between this Code and the General Agreement, furthermore, would
need to be clarified.
Were the agreement to take the form of a treaty, the question of
whether or not the executive branch of government has the authority
to make such an agreement without the approval of the legislature
would be avoided. While in the United States the treaty-making power
"extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government
and the governments of other nations,' '7 2 it was not until recently clear
whether or not the President had authority to make an executive
agreement concerning non-tariff standards barriers without the ap-
70. E.g., see Note, The Restrictive Effects of Industrial Standards on International Commerce,
supra note 67, at 611-12, 619-20 (lack of opportunity to comment on a proposed statute
regarding eyeglasses).
This procedure should help to preclude any violation of the "internal affairs" limita-
tion on United States treaty-making powers.
71. In Australia, 100 percent of national standards are voluntary; in U.S.S.R. 100
percent are compulsory; and in Turkey 82 percent are voluntary and' 18 percent
compulsory. American National Standards Institute, ISO Member Bodies, supra note 24.
72. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
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proval of Congress. In the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 3 however,
Congress explicitly found that "barriers to ... international trade are
reducing the growth of foreign markets for the products of [the] United
States"74 and authorized the President to
take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power (including the full exercise
of the rights of the United States under international agreements) to harmonize,
reduce, or eliminate such barriers to .. .international trade.75
Among the steps which the President may take under the Act to help
eliminate non-tariff barriers is that of entering into trade agreements
with foreign countries,7 6 although before doing so he must consult with
several congressional committees. Moreover the Congress, after receiv-
ing notification from the President, a copy of the agreement, and a draft
of proposed implementing legislation, must pass a bill implementing the
agreement before it is to take effect. 77 If the appropriate procedures are
followed and the President and the Congress cooperate as planned, this
procedure will provide the ideal vehicle for adopting the GATT Code as
an executive agreement.
Whether or not the Code should be self-executing will probably
depend on the extent, if any, to which it is integrated into the GATT.
If it takes the form of a completely independent treaty, it might well be
self-executing, provided conflicts as to its effects on existing national
and regional standards and standards systems can be reconciled.
The question of self-execution becomes an inquiry into the extent to
which the provisions of the GATT itself are self-executing assuming, as
seems likely, that the Code will be closely tied to GATT. Courts in
Europe and the United States have been split on this question. With
regard to Article III of the GATT, one German case has held it was
73. Pub. L. No. 93-618 (Dec. 20, 1974), 88 Stat. 1978. For a portion of the legislative
history of this act, see note 1 supra.
74. Id. § 102(a).
75. Id. § 102(a).
76. Id. § 102(b). Even before this act was passed, authority existed for the position that
the President may conclude an executive agreement in the commercial area without the
express approval of Congress. Communique Regarding a Joint United States-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission on May 26, 1972, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 924 (June 2,
1972). The Commission was established to promote development of mutually beneficial
commercial relations between the two countries. Among other things the Commission was
to study possible United States-U.S.S.R. participation in the manufacture of various
products. See also B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912), upholding an
agreement dealing with commercial relations between two countries, authorized by Con-
gress. See generally Hearings on S. 596, H.R. 14363, and H.R. 14647 Before the Subcomm. on
National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
77. Pub. L. No. 93-618, supra note 73, § 102(e).
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not self-executing, while two decisions of the Italian Court of Appeal
have determined that it was. 78 In a similar showing of inconsistency in
American courts, one California decision held Article III to be self-
executing, while a New York holding disagreed.7 9
Other difficulties awaiting the determination of the Working Group
on Standards include questions regarding the range of products to
which the Code should apply, the extent to which total harmonization
should be sought, the parties to which the Code's obligations and
benefits should extend, the application of the Code to private, non-
governmental bodies, the resolution of conflicts between state and
federal agencies in countries such as the United States, and the power
of GATT to enforce compliance with provisions of the Code.
CONCLUSION
With the divergence among national products standards on the rise,
nations have earnestly sought means by which standards can be har-
monized so as to reduce the trade barrier effect of product standard
incompatibility. Due to differences in national circumstances and val-
ues, however, most regional and international bodies have found it
difficult to achieve total harmonization of standards, test procedures,
and certification programs. Several beginnings have nonetheless
proved relatively successful in eliminating some standards trade bar-
riers.
The EEC in requiring its Member States to adopt domestic legislation
which "approximates" standards found in Council directives has re-
duced the incompatibility among standards and increased the free flow
of goods in areas under its jurisdiction, though it seems that the
"approximation" approach is best suited to a group like the EEC in
78. Kapteyn, The "Domestic" Law Effect of Rules of International Law Within the European
Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-Executing Character of GAT Rules, 8
INT'L LAWYER 74, 77 (1974).
79. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior CL, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr.
798 (1962); American Institute for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie, 58 Misc. 2d
1059, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 32 App. Div. 2d 231, 302 N.Y.S.2d 61
(4th Dep't 1969). See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT
106-107 (1970). The discussion in a German case of several years ago illustrates the two
sides of the problem. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1969, 16 AWD 91 (Finanzgericht Hamburg).
The case appears in English translation at 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 627; it is commented upon
in id. at 548. A discussion of the problem also appears in Kapteyn, supra note 78, at
77-82, where the author concludes that the "weak judicial character" of GATT provisions
derives not so much from an analysis of the Agreement itself, but rather from the
practice of their past application. Id. at 81.
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which Member States are under some legal obligation to follow the
directives of a Council of Ministers.
The more successful route may prove to be that of the EFTA,
requiring reciprocal recognition of accepted standards and testing
procedures of exporting nations by importing nations. This approach
does not require change in domestic standards but still leaves open the
possibility of future harmonization of those standards, while preserving
the ease of implementation.
The litmus test of both of these approaches, however, lies ahead in
the current round of the GATT talks. The GATT Code of Standards
represents an attempt at harmonization by a broader number of
nations. While the fact that nothing in the Code could apparently
compel participating nations to adopt the harmonized standards may
be a major question mark looming over its effectiveness after adoption,
the GATT Working Group on Standards can at least be assured that
the United States, armed with the provisions of the recent Trade Act of
1974,80 is fully prepared to join in the international effort to reduce
trade barriers caused by transnational differences in products stan-
dards. With that assurance, and the universally recognized need for an
improvement in this area,"' the GATT talks may hold real promise for
international product standards harmonization at last.
80. See note 1 supra.
81. See Part I.A. supra.
